The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons faces many challenges. Largely due to the perennial tension between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapons states, the Treaty has been under severe strain for some time. The two most daunting challenges facing the NPT are disarmament and nonproliferation. Although nuclear weapons numbers have fallen sharply since the peak of Cold War numbers in the mid-1980s, many non-nuclear weapon states argue that disarmament is not occurring fast enough. This tension will undoubtedly have a significant impact on nonproliferation efforts.
Other challenges facing the NPT can be observed as an outgrowth of the Treaty’s age, as well as ambiguity within some of the Treaty’s provisions. The crafters of the NPT could not have predicted current global trends and as such were not able to draft a Treaty that could evolve with the times. Current interpretations of the Treaty have led to considerable challenges in NPT implementation.
Nuclear Disarmament
All states parties to the NPT, and in particular the nuclear weapon states (NWS), have a legal obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament.
Article VI of the NPT obligates parties to the Treaty to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Additionally, at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, NWS agreed to undertake “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally” as part of the package to extend the treaty indefinitely, and at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, states parties adopted a final document that included “Thirteen Practical Steps” to achieve nuclear disarmament, including an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon-states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. As well, the Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions, adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, contain a 22-item action plan on nuclear disarmament.”
Despite progress made through agreements and joint initiatives since the height of the Cold War, many non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) believe the NWS have not made a concerted effort to relinquish their nuclear weapons.
THE MODERNIZATION QUESTION
- NWS argue that warheads and delivery systems require regular maintenance to ensure safety and extend service life, and that they must spend money to maintain and upgrade nuclear weapons systems in order to ensure their effectiveness and longevity. They claim that such maintenance does not constitute modernization, since they are not producing new warhead designs
- NNWS welcomed New START and other initiatives, but are anxious to see more concrete actions on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, reducing alert levels, increasing transparency, and other steps. They have also expressed concern over the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and about the possible undermining of bilateral disarmament efforts through the NWS’ modernization and life extension programs for their nuclear arsenals. Many NNWS believe that the development of new delivery systems and qualitative improvements to arsenals constitute modernization. To them, such upgrades suggest that the NWS have no intention of getting rid of their nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future
- Compounding these concerns is the deepening crisis of the US-Russian arms control. In 2014, the United States accused Russia of violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which banned all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. After the two sides failed to resolve the disagreement, in 2019 the United States withdrew from the Treaty, and the INF ceased to exist
- New START is set to expire in February 2021, but the United States and Russia have the option of extending the treaty by five years. If New START is not extended, after February 5, 2021 there will be no bilateral US-Russian arms control agreements in place for the first time since 1972
- Against this backdrop, the United States has begun the development on new intermediate-range missiles systems that would have been in violation of the INF Treaty. Russia has been actively developing an array of new weapons systems, including a new “heavy” ICBM designed to overcome US missile defense, hypersonic weapon systems, and novel systems like the “Burevestnik” nuclear-powered cruise missile
BEYOND
Russia
United States
| Russia and the U.S. | Other NPT NWS | Other NW Possessor States | NNWS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russia and the U.S. possess 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons | Some countries, like China, have supported nuclear disarmament and have stated they will reduce their stockpiles once the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals reach their levels | Other possessor states have not given similar pledges | Welcome New START and other initiatives, but concerned about its extension and eager to see more concrete actions |
| Nuclear arsenal reduction treaties have been largely bilateral between the United States and Russia / the Soviet Union | China has not officially disclosed the size of its arsenal or indicated whether it has implemented any reductions | Persuasion of some states such as North Korea, India, and Pakistan will be difficult due to tensions in their regions | Concern over the New START treaty: “domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization undermine the minimal reductions agreed therein” |
| New START was signed 2 February 2011 and will expire 5 February 2021. New START decreases deployed warheads to 1,550 | France and the United Kingdom have implemented unilateral reductions to their arsenals | Israel’s opacity regarding its nuclear capability remains a large obstacle to its inclusion in nuclear disarmament negotiations | Concern over the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament |
| In April 2009, U.S. President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev jointly expressed their commitment to achieve “a nuclear free world” | Both India and Pakistan are expanding their nuclear arsenals |
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Noncompliance is the most serious nonproliferation challenge facing the NPT. The failure of some non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the treaty to comply with the NPT’s provisions and their safeguards obligations erodes confidence and undermines the goals of the treaty. Nonproliferation noncompliance may also have a negative impact on the pace and future progress of nuclear disarmament. The NPT review process has not so far proved to be an effective tool for tackling noncompliance, and disagreements over how to address some states’ breaches of their commitments complicated the 2005, 2010, and earlier review cycles.
Example States of Compliance Concern
North Korea
- Violated its safeguards agreement, secretly developed plutonium separation and uranium enrichment programs
- Withdrew from the NPT in 2003, but the legitimacy of its withdrawal is contested
- Conducted six nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013, twice in 2016, and in 2017
- Since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted nine major resolutions condemning the DPRK’s missile and nuclear testing and imposing sanctions
- In January 2018, Kim Jong Un announced that the development of the DPRK’s nuclear program had been “completed” and ordered “mass production” of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles
- On June 12, 2018, Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump met in Singapore in the first ever summit between sitting leaders of the United States and the DPRK. The meeting resulted in a joint declaration, in which, among other things, the DPRK and the United States committed, “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The US and North Korean leadership subsequently have had widely different interpretations of this commitment. While the US officials have indicated they expected the DPRK to unilaterally and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons program, the DPRK views denuclearization as part of a long-term effort following the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula
- On February 27-28, 2019, Kim and Trump met in Hanoi, Vietnam for a second summit. The meeting ended without an agreement
Iran
- Previously violated its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), leading the Agency’s Board of Governors to report Iran to the UN Security Council in 2006
- Opaque intentions and continued refusal to fully comply with (IAEA) and UN Security Council resolutions, as well as revelations of earlier nuclear weapons work, led many to worry that Iran may soon be able to develop nuclear weapons
- On July 14, 2015, after almost two years of negotiations, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Iran, together with the European Union, agreed on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA imposes a number of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program and enhanced verification measures, to be carried out by the IAEA, in return for extensive sanctions relief. The agreement limits the level to which Iran can enrich uranium and the amount of low-enriched uranium the country can stockpile. It also commits Iran to not conduct any reprocessing activities and to convert the research reactor under construction in Arak to a less proliferation-sensitive design than the originally planned type
- The JCPOA obligates Iran to bring into force the Additional Protocol (AP) to its safeguard agreement and to implement the AP provisionally, pending its entry into force. The agreement provides for the IAEA’s daily access to facilities in Iran, monitoring of its centrifuge production, and other measures
- In May 2018, President Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, arguing that the deal did not go far enough to limit Iran’s missile program. The United States then proceeded to reinstate sanctions on Iran. In response, Iran has renounced all operational restrictions placed on it by the JCPOA, including enrichment capacity, percentage of enrichment, amount of enriched material, and research and development activities. Iran continues to comply with the verification provisions of the JCPOA.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Article IV of the NPT ensures that NNWS have access to the peaceful use and development of nuclear technology. Rising energy demands have led to a growing number of countries pursuing nuclear energy, and many countries wish to be energy-independent, maintaining a closed nuclear fuel cycle in order to ensure a sustainable and dependable domestic energy supply. An increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities places a significant burden on the IAEA safeguards system, which is tasked with detecting and deterring the diversion of materials and equipment for military nuclear activities. The challenge for the international community will be to reconcile states’ desire for energy independence with their desire to both reduce the intrusiveness of IAEA safeguards and diminish the possibility of proliferation.
Multilateral Approaches to the Fuel Cycle: A possible solution?
- Idea has been explored since the 1940s, but failed to win approval; however, it has recently reemerged. The most ambitious versions of this concept involve placing proliferation-sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies under international rather than national control
- June 2004: Then-IAEA Director-General Mohamed El-Baradei commissioned an international Expert Group to examine incentives and disincentives for multilateral approaches to the front and back ends of the nuclear fuel cycle
- The El-Baradei Report outlined five approaches to strengthen controls over fuel enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel repositories, and spent fuel storage, and explores the establishment of an “intergovernmental fuel bank”
- Opposing arguments:
- Developing countries are concerned that additional restrictions on access to the civilian nuclear fuel cycle would contradict the provisions of Article IV of the NPT
- Some argue that proposals to internationalize the nuclear fuel cycle may further enhance the discriminatory nature of the NPT and cement the technological dominance of the NWS over the NNWS
- In December 2010, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution approving the establishment of a low enriched uranium (LEU) bank as a “last resort” measure to ensure fuel supply for nuclear power programs in cases of disruptions. Any IAEA Member State in full compliance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement may apply to purchase material from the LEU Bank, if it is unable to obtain fuel through any other means
- Kazakhstan volunteered to host the IAEA LEU Bank at its Ulba Metallurgical Plant, and the new storage facility was inaugurated in 2017. The IAEA Fuel Bank became operational in October 2019 with the arrival of the first shipment of LEU. The IAEA purchased a total of 90 tons of LEU to be stored at the Fuel Bank, which is funded entirely through voluntary contributions from Member States and NTI