Module 2:

Nuclear Terrorism

Are terrorist groups interested in carrying out nuclear attacks?

Yes. Although non-state actors have never successfully acquired a nuclear weapon, documented attempts demonstrate some groups are interested in nuclear terrorism.

  • Al Qaeda created a dedicated program to develop nuclear weapons led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the group’s current leader. [i] The group sought religious justification for the use of nuclear weapons, obtaining a fatwa authorization in 2003. [ii] Members of al Qaeda tried repeatedly to buy nuclear material or recruit nuclear experts, and according to the CIA obtained “a rough sketch of a nuclear bomb design” from two Pakistani nuclear scientists. [iii] The program reportedly advanced as far as testing crude conventional explosives for use in a nuclear device [iv]
  • The Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a complete warhead from contacts in Russia in 1992. After failing, the cult unsuccessfully sought to produce its own weapons-usable material, purchasing uranium mines in Australia and investigating uranium enrichment technologies [v]
  • ISIS fighters tracked Belgium’s nuclear power chief for weeks. Many suspect ISIS fighters were planning to kidnap him or a family member to gain access into a plant and gain nuclear material. [vi]

What are the potential terrorist pathways to the bomb?

pathways to the bomb - infographic

How difficult would it be for terrorists to steal and use an assembled nuclear weapon from a state’s nuclear arsenal?

Precise information about the security of nuclear weapons is highly classified, but most experts agree that stealing an intact nuclear weapon would be more difficult than stealing nuclear materials. [xi]

  • A terrorist group would need considerable financial and technical resources, as well as a high degree of organizational and military competency, to mount an attack on a weapons storage facility, transfer a weapon clandestinely to a target, and overcome any safeguards on the weapon itself intended to prevent unauthorized detonation [xii]
  • U.S. nuclear weapons are equipped with Permissive Action Links (PALs), which require the entry of complex security codes to arm a weapon. [xiii] Other safety and security measures include “limited try” features, which disable the warhead after several incorrect entries of the arming code, as well as sensors that detect expected environmental factors, such as acceleration, temperature, pressure, and free fall, that the weapon must experience on its way to a target before it can detonate [xiv]

Measures to prevent theft and unauthorized use are not uniformly robust across all of the nuclear weapon possessing states. [xv]

  • Some older U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons may lack PALs or utilize outdated versions [xvi]
  • Pakistan, India, and China are believed to store fissile cores away from warheads, complicating efforts to steal a functional device, but since fissile cores are smaller than assembled weapons and lack certain safeguards, a terrorist organization might find them attractive for fabricating its own bomb [xvii]

The Russian and Pakistani stockpiles are often identified by experts as facing particularly serious security challenges.

  • Pakistan faces severe internal security challenges from well-equipped insurgent groups, some of which have ties to the state and tried to take control of nuclear sites. Reportedly, at least three notable attacks on Pakistani nuclear weapons facilities occurred from 2007 to 2008. The most serious attack, in 2008 at Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly facility, resulted in 63 deaths following two suicide bombings [xviii]
  • Russia is home to the world’s largest and most widely dispersed nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as sophisticated extremist groups. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the security of Russian nuclear weapons has improved dramatically, but significant weaknesses remain as well as questions about whether Russia is allocating sufficient resources to sustain the security upgrades put in place over the past two decades [xvix]

Serious incidents compromising nuclear weapons security in the United States and Europe demonstrate all national arsenals likely have at least some security vulnerabilities.

  • In 2007, the U.S. Air Force inadvertently flew six nuclear weapons across the United States to an air base in Louisiana that was unaware it had received them. [xx] The weapons sat on the runway for nearly 10 hours before being noticed, and without the appropriate security protocols in place [xxi]
  • In 2010, a group of peace activists infiltrated a military base in Belgium housing 10-20 U.S. nuclear weapons and walked around undetected for over an hour [xxi]

How difficult would it be for terrorists to acquire weapons-usable nuclear material?

In an effort to construct an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), the most difficult challenge for terrorists would be acquiring the necessary quality and quantity of weapons-usable, (i.e., fissile) material.

  • A terrorist group is highly unlikely to produce its own fissile material, whether by enriching uranium or producing plutonium in a reactor and separating it from spent fuel. These tasks require technically complex and expensive processes, are difficult to accomplish clandestinely, and are likely beyond the capabilities of a terrorist organization
  • Obtaining fissile material through purchase or theft are the most realistic options for terrorists
  • Seizures of stolen HEU and plutonium indicate terrorists may be able to purchase fissile material on the black market
  • Security breaches at both civilian and non-civilian fissile material sites demonstrate that some stocks may remain vulnerable to theft
    • In 2007, two armed teams attacked the Pelindaba nuclear facility in South Africa, which stores hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade HEU. One team penetrated an electrified security fence, disabled intrusion detectors without setting off an alarm, shot an employee in the emergency control room, spent 45 minutes inside the facility before being engaged by on-site security forces, and escaped through its original point of entry. [xxiii] While the intruders never infiltrated the HEU storage room, the incident highlighted “substantial weaknesses in the site’s detection, assessment, and response arrangements” [xxiv]
    • In 2012, an elderly nun and two peace activists broke into a high-security U.S. nuclear weapon materials site using bolt cutters to break through the perimeter fence and three interior perimeter fences without setting off alarms. [xxv] While the activists lacked malicious intent and did not infiltrate any of the buildings housing nuclear material, a government review of the incident found “troubling displays of ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures to maintain critical security equipment, overreliance on compensatory measures, misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and weaknesses in contract and resource management” [xxvi]

If they acquired fissile material, could terrorists construct a nuclear device?

Yes. Numerous studies have determined that a sophisticated terrorist organization with fissile material in hand could accomplish the technical and engineering tasks associated with building a crude nuclear weapon.

A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device…Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required.

—U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1977)[xxvii]

We know that acquiring a weapon or the nuclear-explosive material to make one is the hardest step for terrorists to take and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process-building the bomb, transporting it, and detonating it-is easier for the terrorists to take and harder for us to stop.

—Sam Nunn, NTI Co-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer[xxviii]

If fissile material is available, subnational or terrorist groups can likely produce an ‘improvised nuclear explosive device’ which will detonate with a significant nuclear yield.

—U.S. Department of Defense (1998)

Those who say that building a nuclear weapon is easy, they are wrong, but those who say that building a crude device is very difficult are even more wrong .

—Harold Agnew, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory[xxx]

The [U.S.] Intelligence Community assessed that fabrication of at least a ‘crude’ nuclear device was within al-Qa’ida’s capabilities, if it could obtain fissle material.

—Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction[xxxi]

Sources

[i] Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010, p. 12, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf.

[ii] Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010, p. 15, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf.

[iii] Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Project on Managing the Atom, and Harvard University, April 2010, p. 13-14, http://www.nti.org/about/projects/Securing-bomb/.

[iv] Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010, p. 15, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf.

[v] S. Paul Kapur, “Deterring Nuclear Terrorists,” Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, eds. T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, James J. Wirtz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 121-122.

[vi] Mortimer, Caroline, “Brussel Bombings: Terror Group ‘were planning to attack nuclear power station,’ Surveillance Suggests,” London The Independent, March 24, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brussels-attacks-airport-metro-bombings-isis-terror-group-nuclear-power-station-surveillance-footage-a6949821.html.

[vii] Hans. M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5 (September/October 2013), p. 75-81.

[viii] Hans. M Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 6 (November/December 2009), p. 86.

[ix] Allison Graham, “Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,” Policy Memo, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2010 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20057/nuclear_terrorism_fact_sheet.html.

[x] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Construction: How Difficult?” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1 (September 2006), p. 142.

[xi] Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Project on Managing the Atom, and Harvard University, April 2010, p. 16-17, http://www.nti.org/about/projects/Securing-bomb/.

[xii] Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004), p. 54.

[xiii] Stephen I. Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight of the Bomb,” Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, ed. Stephen I. Schwartz (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 514-515.

[xiv] Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (New York: Times Books, 2004), p. 89-90; Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Construction: How Difficult?” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1 (September 2006), p. 145.

[xv] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Construction: How Difficult?” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1 (September 2006), p. 145-146.

[xvi] Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Project on Managing the Atom, and Harvard University, April 2010, p. 17, http://www.nti.org/about/projects/Securing-bomb/.

[xvii] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, “Terrorist Nuclear Weapons Construction: How Difficult?” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1 (September 2006), p. 145.

[xviii] Dean Nelson, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Bases Targeted by al-Qaeda,” The Telegraph, August 11, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/6011668/Pakistans-nuclear-bases-targeted-by-al-Qaeda.html.

[xix] Matthew Bunn, Eben Harrell, and Martin B. Malin “Progress on Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: The Four-Year Effort and Beyond,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Project on Managing the Atom, March 2012, p. 8-10.

[xx] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons,” Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, February 2008 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/usaf/Minot_DSB-0208.pdf.

[xxi] Josh White, “In Error, B-52 Flew Over U.S. with Nuclear-Armed Missiles,” The Washington Post, September 6, 2007.

[xxii] Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Project on Managing the Atom, and Harvard University, April 2010, p. 4, http://www.nti.org/about/projects/Securing-bomb/.

[xxiii] Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Project on Managing the Atom, and Harvard University, April 2010, p. 4-5, http://www.nti.org/about/projects/Securing-bomb/.

[xxiv] Matthew Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010: Securing All Nuclear Materials in Four Years,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Project on Managing the Atom, and Harvard University, April 2010, p. 4-5, http://www.nti.org/about/projects/Securing-bomb/.

[xxv] Dan Zak, “The Prophets of Oak Ridge,” The Washington Post, September 13, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/wp-style/2013/09/13/the-prophets-of-oak-ridge/.

[xxvi] Fissile Materials Working Group, “Security at Y-12 nun too good,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 2, 2012, http://thebulletin.org/security-y-12-nun-too-good.

[xxvii] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1977).

[xxviii] Sam Nunn, “Ten years of reducing nuclear dangers,” The Hill, June 3, 2014, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/207915-ten-years-of-reducing-global-nuclear-dangers.

[xxiv] Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, “Section V: Nuclear Weapons Technology,” in The Military Critical Technology List (Washington, DC: February 1998), p. 58 http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/mctl98-2.pdf.

[xxx] Matthew Bunn, and Yuri Morozov, Rolf Mowatt-Larrsen, Simon Saradzhyan, William Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev, The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism, Report for Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, June 6, 2011, p. 19.

[xxxi] The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, p. 276, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/index.html.