Non-proliferation Regime

• The nuclear-weapon possessing states have conducted about 2,087 tests from 1945-2017 to assess and improve the capabilities of their arsenals [1]
• Test bans support arms control and nonproliferation objectives by making it difficult for new states to develop reliable nuclear weapons, and for the existing nuclear weapon-possessing states to enhance their arsenals’ capabilities [2]
• Support for a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 was largely possible because of worldwide concern about the detrimental human health and environmental effects of atmospheric and underwater testing
• The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 has made nuclear testing taboo – even nuclear-armed states that have not signed or ratified the CTBT observe nuclear testing moratoriums. [3]

Partial or Limited Test Ban Treaty (PTBT or LTBT)

Prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, underwater, and anywhere radioactive debris would end up outside the territory of the state conducting the test

• Signed in 1963 by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom
• Will become obsolete if and when the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Prohibits all nuclear weapons testing

• Negotiated from 1993 to 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD); opened for signature in September 1996
• Will enter into force 180 days after 44 “Annex 2” states have ratified the treaty. Of those 44 states:
  • North Korea, India, and Pakistan have not yet signed or ratified
  • China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but not yet ratified.

How will the international community monitor compliance with the CTBT?

• The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization maintains a worldwide test detection network, named the International Monitoring System (IMS)
• The IMS’s detection capabilities include seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and radionuclide analysis:
  • Seismic monitors detect seismic event signatures; nuclear weapons test signatures are distinguishable from earthquakes and background activity
  • Infrasound monitors search for atmospheric pressure differences caused by the movement of infrasound waves, such as those released by above-ground nuclear tests
  • Hydroacoustic monitors search for the distinct sound waves caused by underwater nuclear detonations
  • Radionuclide stations detect the small particles released by nuclear testing (e.g., xenon-133). Radionuclide laboratories assist radionuclide stations in determining whether the particles collected are indicative of nuclear testing or other nuclear activities
• As of 2023, 90% of the 337 IMS monitoring stations and laboratories across 89 countries are online and have been certified [4]
• Following entry-into-force, the CTBT provides for additional verification through on-site inspection as necessary.

• Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) are legally binding agreements between states that prohibit the development, manufacturing, control, possession, testing, stationing, and transportation of nuclear weapons within their geographical territories
• Article VII of the NPT recognizes the right for states to establish NWFZs in their regions
• Nuclear weapon states (NWS) are prohibited from testing, transporting, transferring, or stationing nuclear weapons in NWFZs
• Non-nuclear weapon states in NWFZs are not permitted to host nuclear weapons belonging to the NWS
• Five regional NWFZs have entered into force:
  • Treaty of Tlatelolco – Latin America and the Caribbean
  • Treaty of Rarotonga – the South Pacific
  • Treaty of Bangkok – South East Asia
  • Treaty of Pelindaba – African Continent
  • Treaty of Semipalatinsk  – Central Asia.
• Mongolia is the only single-state NWFZ
• Three NWFZs based on “geographical limitations” exist:
  • Treaty of Antarctica – Antarctica, including the ice shelves
  • Seabed Treaty – the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil thereof
  • Outer Space Treaty – outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.
• If you combined all NWFZs, it would cover 84 million square kilometers, 114 countries, and 39% of the world population.

Proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, or FMCT

• Main objectives
  • The treaty would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes
  • Many non-nuclear-weapon states argue that the future treaty should cover all existing stocks of fissile materials in military programs, while nuclear weapons states support only the cut-off of future fissile materials production
  • Would require each party to agree to convert, disable, decommission, and possibly dismantle existing facilities producing fissile material for weapons purposes
  • States possessing nuclear weapons will have to accept safeguards or other international controls on fuel cycle facilities to ensure that materials produced there are not used for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices
  • Would establish an FMCT organization to implement the treaty.
• Current status
  • Will be debated in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) once a program of work is adopted by member states
  • The CD has not been able to  commence FMCT negotiations since 1996
  • Pakistan has been blocking the adoption of a program of work that would allow the negotiations to start, insisting that the negotiation mandate should include existing stocks, and that nuclear disarmament negotiations should begin in a parallel committee at the CD
• History
  • Discussion on a cut-off for production of fissile material began in the 1960s
  • In 1995, the CD established an ad hoc committee to discuss the FMCT, but effective negotiations have not occurred
  • In 2006, the George W. Bush administration submitted an FMCT proposal at the CD in 2006 which proposed a fifteen-year ban on the production of HEU and plutonium, two key components of nuclear weapons [6]
  • In 2016, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/259 to create a “high level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) expert preparatory group” to negotiate an FMCT
  • In 2018 and 2019, the CD held discussions that failed to reach consensus among subsidiary bodies [7]
• Challenges
  • How to unblock the CD and commence negotiations
  • How to include existing stockpiles of fissile material
  • How an FMCT would be verified
  • How to obtain buy-in from countries that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons but have not signed the NPT.
    • Israel opposes a FMCT because it does not believe its safeguards would be effective enough to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons program.
    • Pakistan’s opposition to a FMCT is predicated on India’s supposed larger stockpile of nuclear weapons.
    • North Korea announced a step-up in plutonium production in 2009 despite its willingness to discuss a FMCT.

   

  Proposed Treaty on Negative Security Assurances (NSA)

  • Main objectives
    • Nuclear weapon states would conclude arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against them (including by revising domestic policies and military doctrines appropriately)
    • Nuclear weapon states have made non-binding, limited scope, or qualified negative security assurances; non-nuclear weapon states want these promises codified into a legally binding, unconditional, universal free-standing treaty or protocol to the NPT
    • Nuclear weapon states have provided legally-binding negative security assurances to some of the NWFZs
  • Current status
    • Issue remains on the permanent agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), but no progress has been made due to the deadlock therein.
  • History
    • The first legally-binding negative security assurance was contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and all five nuclear weapon states have ratified the protocol containing this provision
    • Since the 1960s, the non-nuclear weapon states have called upon the nuclear weapon states to commit to legally-binding negative security assurances
    • The United States has not ratified the NSA protocol to any NWFZ treaty except Tlatelolco, and none of the nuclear weapon states has signed the protocols to the Treaties of Bangkok and Central Asian NWFZ
    • In 1978, each NWS issued unilateral, non-binding assurances, some of which had qualifications attached
    • From 1983 to 1994, the CD established an ad-hoc committee to discuss NSAs
    • Every year since 1990, Pakistan has introduced a resolution on NSAs in the UN General Assembly.
  • Challenges
    • Debate over whether legally binding negative security assurances should be negotiated as a new treaty at the CD or in the context of the NPT review process
    • Nuclear weapon states see NSAs as weakening the theory and practice of deterrence and currently do not support the negotiation of an NSA treaty